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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

KATHY P. BINGHAM,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 920508
DAVID P. BINGHAM,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT REGARDING REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellee previously filed a Cross-Appeal, and
has now filed her Brief.

Pursuant to Rule 24(h), Utah Rules

of Appellate Procedure, the Appellee's Brief contains her
issues and arguments raised by her Cross-Appeal, as well as
her Answer to Appellant's Brief.

Pursuant to Rule 24(c),

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant files this
Brief as a Reply Brief and in response to issues presented
by the Cross-Appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

The Court did not error in its interpretation of

Section 78-45-7.5(4) by allowing money spent for the
purchase of assets to be deducted as a necessary expense for
self-employment or business operations.

1

The Court correctly

applied the section in question regarding the purchase of
assets.
2.

The Court's refusal to classify principal payouts

on loans as necessary expenses for self-employment or
business operations was an error, and a misapplication of
Section 78-45-7.5(4) .
3.
alimony.

The Trial Court abused its discretion in awarding
The Court clearly has power to award alimony

equalizing the parties1 living standards and attempting to
maintain them at a level as close as possible to the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.

The Court's

error was in miscalculating the amount of defendant's
income, and in awarding an amount of alimony greater than
plaintiff's need.
4.

The Trial Court erred in failing to subtract the

gift from defendant's parents prior to calculating the
equity in the defendant's business.
5.

The Trial Court erred in determining that the feed

inventory was part of the equity to be divided.
6.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in

ordering each party to pay its own attorney's fees and
costs.

STflTEMSNT 9F FftCTg
Refer to Appellant's original Brief.

2

Appellee's Brief

contains one major error in its Statement of Facts, on Page
3, the first sentence of the second paragraph, wherein she
states that "Bingham Dairy was purchased by the couple in
1982."

In fact, Bingham Dairy was incorporated in 1982 to

purchase an existing dairy.

Defendant and his father

incorporated Bingham Dairy, and plaintiff has never had any
ownership interest whatsoever in Bingham Dairy.

(Tr, p.

174,)

ARGlftiENT
POINT I
THE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED SECTION 78-45-7.5(4),
BY ALLOWING MONEY SPENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF ASSETS
TO BE DEDUCTED AS A NECESSARY EXPENSE FOR SELFEMPLOYMENT OR BUSINESS OPERATIONS.
The Trial Court, without the benefit of explanatory
factual findings, decided that money spent for the purchase
of assets is an appropriate self-employment deduction, while
at the same time ruling that principal payouts on loans are
not.
Defendants position is that both should be allowed as
deductions, because both represent money reasonably and
necessarily expended for self-employment or business
operation.
The Court is referred to Appellant's original Brief,
Point I, beginning on Page 10 of the Brief.

That argument,

which refers in turn to defendant's Exhibit 4, explains
3

defendant's argument thoroughly.

POINT II
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO CLASSIFY PRINCIPAL PAYOUTS
ON LOANS AS A NECESSARY EXPENSE FOR SELF-EMPLOYMENT
OR BUSINESS OPERATION WAS ERROR.
This issue is thoroughly discussed in Point I of
Appellant's original Brief, and Point I immediately above.
Any further discussion would be repetitive.

POINT III
THE ALIMONY AWARD WAS IN ERROR.
In Point I of his original Brief, defendant shows that
the Court erred by calculating his income improperly.

This

resulted in both the alimony and child support calculations
being improperly high.

Furthermore, in Point II of his

original Brief, defendant shows that the Court further erred
by awarding more alimony than plaintiff's own evidence
established as her need.
The Trial Court certainly has discretion to equalize
and maintain the standard of living comparable to that
enjoyed during the marriage.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court,
through its misinterpretation of Section 78-45-7.5(4),
calculated defendant's income incorrectly.

The issue for

consideration is the amount of alimony which should have
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been awarded; if this Court determines that the Trial Court
incorrectly calculated defendant's income, then the issue of
alimony must be reconsidered, and the amount awarded reduced
correspondingly.
Plaintiff ran her household, paid all of her living
expenses, and took care of the children on a draw of $2,000
per month.

(Tr, p. 75; p. 193.)

She testified that she

needed alimony of $1,500 per month (Tr, p. 44, lines 8-22;
p. 45, lines 23-25), and submitted her Exhibit 16 showing
her current monthly expenses to be $2,035.
The Trial Court correctly awarded plaintiff the home,
and her new Van, neither of which requires a monthly
payment.

That is exactly what plaintiff had prior to the

divorce, except for the additional $2,000 per month to run a
household consisting of herself, all of the children, and
her husband.

Her husband is no longer part of her

household; if her standard of living is maintained exactly
as it was prior to the termination of the marriage, her
total alimony and child support should be somewhat less than
$2,000 per month.

The Court awarded $3,181.

The alimony issues are discussed and argued in Point I
and II of Appellant's Brief.

POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUBTRACT A GIFT FROM
DEFENDANT'S PARENTS IN CALCULATING THE DAIRY EQUITY.
5

Appellee's argument in her Point IV partially misses
the point.
In this particular case, the focus is upon the source
of the property.

Defendant agrees that property accumulated

by joint efforts of the parties should be divided equally
between the parties, or at least be subject to equitable
division.
A careful reading of Appellant's Point III in his
original Brief would show that defendant assumes the total
appraised value of the dairy to be the beginning point.
This approach accounts for and allows any appreciation in
the dairy assets, and treats such appreciation as a joint
asset.

The issue is whether the amount of the gift

($174,000) should be deducted from that total equity.
Appellant's Point III addresses this issue; to the
extent Appellee's Point IV does not, she misses the point.

POINT V
THE FEED INVENTORY IS NOT PART OF THE
EQUITY TO BE DIVIDED.
This issue is thoroughly discussed in Appellant's Point
IV, in his original Brief.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REQUIRING EACH PARTY TO PAY ITS OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES.

6

The Trial Court clearly has discretion to award
attorney's fees in a divorce case, pursuant to the standards
enunciated by the cases quoted in plaintiff's Point V of her
Brief.
The Court is to base its decision upon evidence of the
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the
other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the fees.
The award of the attorney's fees must be based upon
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness
of the requested fees.
App. 1991).

See Bell vs. Bell, 810 P2d 489 (Utah

Sufficient evidence must be offered regarding

attorney's fees at the trial.

See Mauahan vs. Mauohan. 770

P2d 156 (Utah App. 1989).
In the instant case, no evidence regarding attorney's
fees was presented, except as appears on Pages 53 and 54 of
the record, where plaintiff's attorney asked if she wanted
attorney's fees and if she was able to pay them.
Plaintiff's counsel then merely stated that he would "submit
an affidavit at the end of this matter".
Plaintiff was not awarded attorney's fees, and should
not be, because she presented no evidence at that trial in
support of those fees.
Concerning costs, at the end of the trial plaintiff's
attorney asked to recall his expert witness for the purpose

7

of testifying to his fees and charges (Tr. p. 211, lines 17).
The parties, in effect, stipulated that plaintifffs
expert witness fees could be submitted by affidavit.

(Tr.

p. 211, lines 8-13) .
The Court then ordered that the attorneyfs fee
affidavit proposed by plaintiff's counsel should be
submitted along with a post-trial brief.

(Tr. p. 211, lines

14-19).
There was never any stipulation regarding submitting
attorney's fees by affidavit.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Court did
consider the issue of attorney's fees and costs, and
exercise its discretion properly, at least based upon the
facts as the Court found them.

The Court found that

defendant had a gross monthly income of $5,587, of which he
awarded $3,181 to the plaintiff, leaving defendant $2,406.
Using these erroneous figures, it is respectfully submitted
that the Court calculated the plaintiff had more money than
the defendant, and could afford to pay her own attorney's
fees and costs.
Also, it is possible the Trial Court considered the
argument raised by defendant in his post-trial brief
regarding attorney's fees, found at Pages 186-187 of the
Record, challenging the reasonableness of the fees.

8

CQNCfcVglQW
The Trial Court's basic error in failing to allow
principal payouts on loans as necessary expenses, pursuant
to the applicable statute, resulted in the Court's award for
child support and alimony being improperly high.
Additionally, regarding the alimony, the Court awarded
more than plaintiff's own testimony purportedly established
as her need, and far more than the evidence established as
her actual need.
The failure to subtract the gift of $174,000 to
defendant from the dairy equity resulted in an improper and
inequitable property division; the Trial Court's error in
determining that the feed inventory should be divided as
part of the equity further compounded that error.
The Court did not abuse its discretion by ordering each
party to pay its own attorney's fees and costs; plaintiff
failed to present evidence of attorney's fees in the
required fashion, and the Court declined to award costs and
fees because under the Court's ruling the plaintiff had a
greater monthly income than the defendant.
The Trial Court failed to make findings concerning any
of these issues, leaving the Appellate Court to guess at the
Trial Court's reasoning.

The Trial Court is required to

make adequate factual findings on all material issues,
unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted,
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and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the
judgment.

See Chambers vs. Chambers. 198 Utah Adv. Rep 49

(Utah App. 1992); Haumont vs. Haumont, 793 P2d 421 (Utah
App. 1990); Throckmorton vs. Throckmorton, 767 P2d 121 (Utah
App. 1988); Acton vs. Deliran. 737 P2d 996 (Utah, 1987).
In this particular case, the Trial Judge has resigned
from the bench and is incapacitated, so any remand should be
for a new trial.
Defendant does not necessarily request a remand; in a
divorce case, the Appellate Court can review the transcript
and make its own findings and rulings.
However, if this Court deems remand to be an
appropriate remedy, it is requested that the Court rule on
the core issue in this case, that being the proper
interpretation of Section 78-45-7.5(4) as it applies to the
purchase of assets and principal payouts on loans.
DATED this

day of

x/0jrp^&*&A>t—

1992.

JQtf jT BUNDERSON
JON
ATTC
TORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
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